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Few interests can be more compelling than a nation’s need to ensure its 
own security.  It is well to remember that freedom as we know it has been 
suppressed in many countries.  Unless a society has the capability and will 
to defend itself from the aggressions of others, constitutional protections 
of any sort have little meaning.2 
This practice, [the use of secret evidence,] which was a mainstay of every 
tyrannical regime in history and which the United States has consistently 
denounced, is now accepted.3 
The ability to use secret evidence in trials involving national security matters is 
an extremely controversial power of the government lawyer.  Although the use of 
secret evidence was a divisive issue before September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks 
that day sparked the passage of new legislation that increased the power of the 
government lawyer to use classified evidence.  By examining the cases involving 
secret evidence both before and after September 11, in particular the case of Zacarias 
Moussaoui, it becomes apparent that what is at stake is the appropriate balance 
                                                                
1J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School; B.A., Williams College, 2001. 
2Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 556 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 611-12 (1985)). 
3Steven W. Becker, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . .”: Assessing the Aftermath of 
September 11th, 37 VAL. U.L. REV. 563, 615-16 (2003). 
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between national security concerns and the constitutional rights of defendants.  
Current legislation gives prosecutors significant authority in determining whether 
and how secret evidence will be used and in what forum; it is crucial that 
government lawyers use this power with integrity.  Only by appropriately balancing 
defendants’ rights and national security concerns can justice be done in cases 
involving threats to national security.   
I.  THE USES OF SECRET EVIDENCE  
A.  The Immigration and Nationality Act 
Secret evidence has been used by government lawyers since the 1950’s, when its 
use was motivated by fear of the national security threat posed by Communists.4  
Enacted in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows the use of secret 
evidence in excluding aliens seeking entry to the United States as well as in 
considering applications by aliens for discretionary relief.5  The term “secret 
evidence” usually refers to evidence that an immigrant in a deportation or exclusion 
proceeding is not allowed to see and the source of which is concealed,6 but its use 
has been expanded to criminal cases.  Government officials claim that such 
anonymity is necessary because without it no one would provide information about 
terrorist activities.7  Additionally, in terms of the recent application of secret 
evidence, the anonymity of the source of such information protects highly advanced 
technical surveillance systems, such as satellite systems, from being compromised by 
revelations about the methods of the technology.8 
Recently, particularly since the late 1980’s, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) has used secret evidence in detaining and deporting Muslims and 
Arabs.9  Whereas in other contexts distinctions made based on national origin or race 
would come under heightened judicial scrutiny, the plenary power doctrine allows 
Congress to make immigration and deportation decisions on such bases.10  “Because 
deportation is deemed not to be punishment, the constitutional protections 
                                                                
4Ronald Smothers, U.S. Bars or Expels Suspect Immigrants on Secret Evidence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1998, at A1. 
5Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 
707-08 (2002). 
6Smothers, supra note 4. 
7Id. 
8Id. 
9Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary 
Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 19 (2003) 
[hereinafter Saito, Plenary Power]; see also Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality 
After September 11? American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 1, 37 (2002) [hereinafter Saito, American Jurisprudence]. 
10Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9, at 20. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/6
2004-05] USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE BY GOVERNMENT LAWYERS 573 
guaranteed to all persons in criminal trials do not apply, allowing, among other 
things, the use of secret evidence and indefinite incarceration without a hearing.”11   
In Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,12 Fouad Rafeedie, a 
fourteen-year lawful permanent resident alien, was arrested upon trying to reenter the 
United States after a 1986 trip to Syria in which he attended the First Conference of 
the Palestine Youth Organization (PYO).13  The INS claimed that the PYO was 
affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a terrorist 
organization.14  Rafeedie denied affiliation with any group engaged in or supporting 
terrorism.15  Upon his arrest at the airport, Rafeedie was paroled for deferred 
inspection, but was eventually charged, the following year, with being excludable 
from the United States.16  During the ensuing summary exclusion proceedings, the 
INS relied upon secret evidence, claiming that disclosing the evidence would be 
“prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security of the United States.”17  The 
District of Columbia Circuit disallowed the use of such evidence indirectly by 
finding that due process was required in the proceedings and by describing the perils 
of the use of secret evidence that would presumably endanger Rafeedie’s due process 
rights.18  The court reasoned as follows: Rafeedie was a lawful permanent resident 
and the secret evidence involved concerned Rafeedie’s activities while in the United 
States; further, Rafeedie would have been entitled to due process had he been the 
subject of a deportation proceeding while living in the United States.19  Therefore, 
due process was required in the exclusion proceedings.20  The court also noted that if 
the use of secret evidence was allowed, Rafeedie could “prevail . . . only if he 
[could] rebut the undisclosed evidence against him . . . . It is difficult to imagine how 
even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden.”21 
                                                                
11Id.  See also Smothers, supra note 4 (explaining that a Justice Department spokesman 
has said “that the courts have allowed the use of secret evidence because they consider grants 
of political asylum and other efforts for noncitizens as ‘discretionary benefits and 
extraordinary acts of sovereign generosity.’”). 
12880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
13Id. at 508-09.  In his original application for a reentry permit, Rafeedie claimed that he 
was visiting Cyprus to be with his mother, who required major heart surgery, but in truth his 
mother lived in Ohio.  Id. at 508. 
14Id. at 509. 
15Id. 
16Id. 
17Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 688 F. Supp. 729, 734 (D.D.C. 1988). 
18Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 523. 
19Id. 
20Id.   
21Id. at 516.  For a shorter summary of the case, see Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, 
“Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy”: Race, 
Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and 
Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 321-22 (2002). 
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Controversial secret evidence was used in another case soon after Rafeedie.  The 
“Iraqi Seven”22 were Iraqi Kurds who “worked for a CIA-funded Iraqi opposition 
group.”23  Although the men were evacuated from Iraq to the United States by the 
United States government, the INS eventually initiated exclusion proceedings against 
them because of alleged visa violations.24  The men were held for a year on the basis 
of secret evidence.25  The group sought asylum in the United States, claiming that 
they would be persecuted if they returned to Iraq.26  The immigration judge 
concluded, mainly on the basis of the secret evidence, that the men were threats to 
national security and thus could not remain in the United States.27   
Despite the Iraqis’ attorney having the highest security clearance possible, he was 
prevented from seeing the evidence.28  During a later stage of the litigation, the INS 
declassified most of the material, releasing five hundred pages of the secret evidence 
and giving unclassified summaries of the remainder of the evidence.29  At that time it 
was revealed that much of the material had been “erroneously classified,” contained 
substantial translation errors, and demonstrated “ethnic and religious stereotyping by 
the FBI,” and further that some of the information was unreliable, “including rumors 
and innuendo.”30  Five of the seven men eventually settled their cases by 
“withdrawing their asylum claims in exchange for release from detention.”31 
B.  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Individual Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which permit the use of secret 
evidence in removal proceedings,32 in particular, those resulting from allegations of 
terrorism.33  This occurred even though, according to Steven W. Becker, these laws 
are “a clear violation of the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine those 
                                                                
22Some articles describe the group as consisting of six men.  See, e.g., Smothers, supra 
note 4. 
23Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 323-24.   
24Id. 
25Smothers, supra note 4. 
26Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 324. 
27Id. 
28Smothers, supra note 4. 
29See id.; Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 324. 
30Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 324. 
31Id. 
32Id. at 322. 
33Spiro, supra note 5, at 708. 
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who proffer charges or testimony against another.”34  Under AEDPA, special courts 
called “alien terrorist removal courts” can be created for such cases.35   
After the passage of AEDPA, the INS initiated nearly two dozen deportation 
actions on the basis of secret evidence that it claimed would threaten national 
security if revealed.36  In 1999, “twenty-five secret evidence cases were pending in 
the United States”;37 by 2000, new cases involving secret evidence were arising 
monthly.38 
Examples of cases that occurred in this time period include those of Nasser 
Ahmed, Anwar Haddam, Mazen al-Najjar, and Imad Hamad.  Beginning in 1996, 
Nasser Ahmed, an Egyptian man whose children were United States citizens, was 
detained for more than three years, “mostly in solitary confinement,” while he was 
the subject of deportation proceedings, during which the INS relied primarily on 
secret evidence.39  The INS claimed that Ahmed was a threat to national security 
because he was in some way associated with a terrorist organization.40  The INS only 
revealed Ahmed’s alleged association after a year of his incarceration and never 
specified the group Ahmed was allegedly associated with.41  When the INS 
eventually had to disclose the secret evidence, it was revealed that much of the 
information upon which the INS had relied was unsubstantiated.42  The district judge 
ruled that Ahmed was not a national security threat and ordered that he be released.43  
“[I]t turned out that the FBI and INS [had been] attempting to make good on their 
threat to deport him for refusing to inform on Sheik Abdel Rahman, who was on trial 
for conspiracy in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.”44 
Anwar Haddam, an elected member of the Algerian Parliament, a professor, and 
a spokesperson for the Islamic Salvation Front, was arrested in 1996 on the basis of 
secret evidence, which supposedly demonstrated his connection to terrorist 
organizations.45  Shortly after his arrest, the INS commenced exclusion proceedings 
                                                                
34Becker, supra note 3, at 615. 
35Spiro, supra note 5, at 708.  See also Smothers, supra note 4. 
36Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 322. 
37Id. at 321.  Between 1992 and 1998, fifty cases involved secret evidence.  Smothers, 
supra note 4.  From 1990 to 2000, secret evidence was used to imprison approximately 100 
people.  Tim Weiner, Congress Reviewing Use of Evidence Kept Secret, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 
2000, at A19. 
38Weiner, supra note 37. 
39See Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325-26; Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9 at 
19. 
40Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9, at 19. 
41Id. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
44Id. at 20. 
45Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325; In re Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20, *7 (Bd. 
of Imm. App. 2000). 
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against him.46  When the secret evidence was later disclosed, it was found to be 
unreliable.47  The appellate judge stated that the evidence was conclusory and 
provided an insufficient basis for finding that Haddam was a danger to the United 
States or involved with terrorist organizations.48  Haddam was released after four 
years of detention.49 
In 1997, Mazen al-Najjar was arrested and removal proceedings were initiated 
against him on the basis of secret evidence.50  The INS claimed that the thirteen-year 
United States resident had overstayed his student visa and constituted a security 
threat because he was “connected with terrorism.”51  Al-Najjar was “an editor of the 
journal of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a think-tank based at the 
University of South Florida devoted to promoting discussion of Middle East 
issues.”52  His arrest and detainment were the result of an FBI investigation into the 
activities of “a former WISE administrator who became head of the Islamic Jihad.”53  
Al-Najjar was held for over three years before the secret evidence that was the basis 
of his imprisonment was disclosed during an “open evidence” hearing.54  At this 
point it was discovered that the secret evidence, consisting of a video tape that was 
said to show that al-Najjar raised funds for Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist 
group, contained no such evidence.55  As a result, the judge ordered the release of al-
Najjar.56 
In Imad Hamad’s case, the INS was determined to prevent Hamad from obtaining 
permanent resident status.57  A resident of the United States since 1980, Hamad was 
a social worker who was married to a United States citizen.58  In his immigration 
court hearings in 1989, the INS displayed photographs from the FBI showing Hamad 
“participating in demonstrations and fund-raising events for local Arab-American 
groups” and stated that Hamad was a member of the PFLP.59  Proceedings related to 
                                                                
46In re Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20 at *7. 
47Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325. 
48In re Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20 at *112-14. 
49Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325. 
50Id. at 324-25. 
51Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; The Uses of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2000, at 
A21. 
52Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 324-25. 
53Id. at 325. 
54Id. at 324-25.  Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9, at 20. 
55See Lewis, supra note 51.   
56Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325.  One source states that “federal officials 
offered to release Al-Najjar if people who knew him would inform on others in the 
community” and that they were thus “using his incarceration to obtain information 
illegitimately.”  Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9, at 20. 
57Smothers, supra note 4. 
58Id. 
59Id. 
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the case occurred periodically for the next four years, but Hamad was never 
deported.60  Five years later, the INS claimed that it had secret evidence 
demonstrating Hamad’s terrorist connections.61  After viewing the evidence, 
however, the judge finally granted Hamad permanent residency.62  Later, in 1998, the 
INS declassified most of the secret evidence.63  According to Hamad’s lawyer, “[t]he 
things they said were secret evidence turned out to be the same declassified stuff we 
saw from the F.B.I. back in the 1989 hearing.”64 
C.  The Secret Evidence Repeal Acts 
Media scrutiny of the use of secret evidence and the resulting constitutional 
concerns contributed to skepticism by courts, Congress, and the Justice Department 
about the necessity and propriety of using secret evidence.65  In 1999, Congress 
proposed the first Secret Evidence Repeal Act.66  The Act recommended (1) 
repealing the alien terrorist removal provisions of the INA, (2) allowing aliens in 
removal proceedings to view all evidence, (3) prohibiting the use of secret evidence 
in applications for immigration benefits, defined to include withholding of 
deportation or removal or granting of asylum, (4) entitling aliens under arrest and 
detention for removal or deportation to government-provided counsel, access to all 
evidence, and judicial review, and (5) exempting lawful permanent residents from 
security and related removal provisions, which allowed for the use of non-disclosed 
information.67  Despite popularity in the House of Representatives and Attorney 
General Janet Reno’s support of revision of the rules involving the use of secret 
evidence, the Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999 was never passed.68 
In 2001, Congress proposed a second Secret Evidence Repeal Act.69  If passed, 
the Act would have required that aliens in any immigration proceeding in which 
classified information would be used receive advance notice of such intention, that 
use of classified information be limited to terrorist activity deportation or opposition 
of an alien’s admission when such information could not be obtained from open 
sources and the government requests declassification, that federal district courts 
review classified material upon the request of the Attorney General or the alien, and 
that the federal district court issue an order containing an unclassified summary of 
                                                                
60Id. 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63Id. 
64Id. 
65Spiro, supra note 5, at 708-09; Smothers, supra note 4. 
66Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. § 6 (1999). 
67Id. 
68See Weiner, supra note 37.  The INS was opposed to such revisions, stating that limits 
on the use of secret evidence “will make us choose either between requesting an agency to 
declassify national security information, or going ahead and letting a benefit be granted to an 
alien who is a danger to national security.”  Id. 
69Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 2001, H.R. 1266, 107th Cong. (2001). 
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classified material when possible.70  Further, the Act would have entitled aliens 
subject to arrest and detention for removal or deportation to “(1) non-federally 
provided counsel; (2) examine all evidence, present evidence, and question 
witnesses; (3) have a complete record of the proceeding kept; and (4) judicial 
review.”71  Like the Act of 1999, the Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 2001 would also 
have exempted lawful permanent residents from security and related removal 
provisions.72 
While these statutes were being considered, the use of secret evidence continued.  
The most well-known case is that of Hany Kiareldeen, a man detained on the basis of 
secret evidence that turned out to be not only untruthful but invented by his vengeful 
ex-wife.73  In 1998, the INS arrested Kiareldeen, a Palestinian-Israeli citizen74 and 
United States resident since 1990, and began proceedings to deport him to Gaza on 
the basis of secret evidence.75  A declassified summary of the secret evidence given 
to Kiareldeen’s attorney revealed that the evidence consisted of statements of 
anonymous informants alleging that Kiareldeen wanted to kill Attorney General 
Janet Reno and that he had met with Nidal A. Ayyad, one of the men convicted in 
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, a week before the attack.76  Kiareldeen 
denied every allegation.77  Later, in immigration court, Kiareldeen also demonstrated 
numerous weaknesses in the secret evidence and that his accuser was probably his 
ex-wife.78  The immigration court released Kiareldeen on bond pending any 
government appeal.79  Numerous attempts by the INS to keep Kiareldeen in detention 
by staying his release were successful, in part because the INS argued that 
Kiareldeen posed a threat to national security; Kiareldeen was finally released in 
October of 1999.80 
D.  The Use of Secret Evidence After September 11 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a tremendous impact on the 
priorities of the federal government.  Commentators theorize that not only is it 
decreasingly likely that a Secret Evidence Repeal Act will be passed,81 but also that 
                                                                
70Id. 
71Id. 
72Id. 
73Smothers, supra note 4. 
74Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 545. 
75Secrecy and Due Process, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1999, at A28 [hereinafter Secrecy and 
Due Process]. 
76Smothers, supra note 4. 
77Id. 
78Secrecy and Due Process, supra note 75. 
79Id. 
80Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 546-47. 
81See Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 349-50; Saito, American Jurisprudence, supra 
note 9, at 38.  This is particularly interesting considering that “[d]uring the 2000 Presidential 
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measures already enacted since September 11, particularly the Executive Order 
issued by President George W. Bush establishing military tribunals, demonstrate that 
the government supports the use of secrecy, particularly in cases involving Arabs and 
Muslims suspected of terrorism or association with terrorist groups.82   
Dicta in Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft demonstrates that the terrorist attacks on 
September 11 made courts increasingly willing to support the use of secrecy to 
prevent further terrorist attacks.  While cautioning that it was only examining 
whether the government “was justified in initiating the proceeding and going forward 
with the hearing before the immigration judge” and not the underlying merits of the 
case, the Third Circuit held that “there was ample substantial justification for the 
position adopted by the government.”83  In doing so, the court noted that “[t]he eerie, 
if not prescient, information that the Joint Terrorism Task Force assembled from its 
sources, must be evaluated in light of ‘the degree of suspicion that attaches to 
particular types of [activities,]’” and that particularly in light of the harsh criticism of 
the FBI following the September 11th attacks, “[the information contained in the 
secret evidence] understandably created apprehension on the part of the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, alerting the government to take all necessary action to 
investigate all leads and assure the defense of the nation.”84 
In contrast, some commentators caution that “September 11 provides no cause to 
retard [the trend of criticizing the use of secret evidence], at least not in the courts.”85  
Spiro suggests that a form of in camera review could effectively be utilized to ensure 
informed decisions and he characterizes as “alarmist” arguments insisting that the 
use of secret evidence is necessary to fight terrorism.”86 
Since September 11, 2001, at least three cases have arisen that involve the use of 
secret evidence, those of Mohamed Atriss, Harpal Singh, and Zacarias Moussaoui.  
In Atriss’s case, the use of secret evidence was disallowed altogether; in Singh’s, the 
court has ordered the government to produce the secret evidence; and in Moussaoui’s 
case, struggles regarding the use of secret evidence continue.87 
Mohamed Atriss is an American citizen who was born in Egypt.88  Atriss has 
been “accused of selling phony identification documents to two of the Sept[ember] 
11, 2001, hijackers.”89  Although none of the charges in the case specifically refer to 
the hijackers, the prosecutors have mentioned Atriss’s connection to them in 
                                                          
campaign, George W. Bush criticized the Clinton administration’s use of secret evidence 
proceedings against Arabs and Muslims as tantamount to unlawful racial profiling.”  Akram & 
Johnson, supra note 21, at 349-50. 
82See infra Part II. 
83Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 554-55. 
84Id. at 556-57. 
85Spiro, supra note 5, at 709. 
86Id. 
87Moussaoui’s case will be discussed in Part III, infra. 
88Dale Russakoff, Use of Secret Evidence Rejected: Court Orders New Hearing for 
Suspect in Fake ID Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2003, at A02, available at 
http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/useofsecret.html. 
89Id. 
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hearings.90  The prosecutors sought to use secret evidence in Atriss’s trial, stating 
that secrecy was justified because release of the material would threaten national 
security.91  They were allowed to use the evidence in a bail proceeding after the 
judge found that it came from a credible witness.92  The appellate court handling the 
case, however, held that the prosecutors “lacked adequate basis” to use the secret 
evidence and ordered the lower court judge to hold a hearing about the reasons 
behind the attempts to use secret evidence.93  The appellate judge also suggested that 
federal officials testify at the hearing about the threat posed to national security by 
the evidence.94  It appears unlikely that the use of secret evidence will be allowed 
because federal officials say that they “believe[] Atriss knew no more about the 
hijackers than about hundreds of other illegal immigrants who patronized him.”95 
In 1999, Harpal Singh and his wife, Rajwinder Kaur, Indian citizens, sought 
asylum in the United States.96  In denying them asylum, the immigration judge stated 
that “the pair engaged in terrorist activities related to their effort to establish a 
separate Sikh state . . . in India.”97  Because the judge also found that it would be 
inappropriate to deport the couple because they would likely suffer torture and 
persecution upon their return to India, Singh and Kaur were detained, although Kaur 
was later released.98  Although the couple denied participating in terrorism, the 
government stated that secret evidence justified their detention.99  In May of 2003, 
the Ninth Circuit ordered the government to produce the classified documents that it 
claims demonstrate Singh’s connection to terrorist activity.100 
II.  THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S EXECUTIVE  
ORDER ESTABLISHING MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 inspired the passage of two pieces of 
legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act and President Bush’s Executive Order 
establishing military tribunals.  Both laws involve controversial infringements on 
constitutional rights, but have been justified by the threat to national security posed 
by past and future terrorism. 
                                                                
90Id. 
91Id. 
92Id. 
93Id. 
94Id. 
95Id. 
96Jessie Mangaliman, ‘Secret Evidence’ Review is Ordered, THE MERCURY NEWS (May 
21, 2003), at http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/5910009.htm.  
97Id. 
98Id. 
99Id. 
100See id.; Singh v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 328 F.3d 1205, 1206 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
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The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) was 
signed into law on October 26, 2001.101  Although the USA PATRIOT Act was 
actually prepared before September 11 and has provisions concerning domestic and 
foreign terrorists, the Act is commonly thought to have been designed and 
implemented as a specific response to the attacks on September 11.102  According to 
one commentator, September 11 provided a rare opportunity for the government to 
“enact proposals that previously had been rejected or were found to be 
unconstitutional and . . . enlarge their own powers while concomitantly eroding the 
civil liberties of law-abiding American citizens.”103 
Comprised of over three hundred pages,104 the USA PATRIOT Act includes a 
considerable number of provisions regarding the appropriate law enforcement 
prevention measures for and response to terrorist activities.  Each type has been 
criticized as infringing on the constitutional rights of suspected terrorists.  For 
instance, one major component of the USA PATRIOT Act is its authorization of 
information-sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.105  
Although such practices have previously led to abuses and infringements on the 
privacy of American citizens,106 the failure of the government to prevent the events 
of September 11 despite the detection by several federal agencies of increasingly 
suspicious activities by known associates of terrorists motivated the current demand 
for information-sharing.107  That such information-sharing is now sanctioned by the 
federal government creates “the specter of intelligence agencies, once again, 
collecting, profiling, and potentially harassing U.S. persons engaged in lawful, First 
Amendment-protected activities.”108   
Additionally, government agencies now have significantly increased information-
gathering power.  Before passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, in order to use 
evidence against a “foreign power” collected from electronic surveillance in a 
criminal trial, the primary purpose of the investigation had to have been the 
                                                                
101Becker, supra note 3, at 592. 
102Id. at 592-93. 
103Id. at 592. 
104John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for 
“Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice 
Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2002). 
105See USA PATRIOT Act § 203(d)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 281 (2001); Becker, supra note 3. 
106Becker, supra note 3, at 596. 
107For information on the investigations of various FBI offices, see The FBI’s Handling of 
the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to 
September 11, 2001: Hearing Before the Joint Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 1-15, 24 
(2002) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Intelligence Inquiry Staff), available 
at http://intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/021017/hillunclass.pdf [hereinafter Intelligence 
Committee Statement]. 
108Becker, supra note 3, at 597 (quoting John Podesta, USA Patriot Act: The Good, the 
Bad, and the Sunset, 29 HUM. RTS. 3, 3 (2002)). 
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gathering of foreign intelligence, and not investigating crimes.109  This rule was 
designed to insure that such searches and seizures only proceed after probable cause 
has been established.110  Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, only 
requires that a significant purpose of an investigation be the gathering of foreign 
intelligence in order to allow the use of wiretap evidence, thus potentially allowing 
investigators to evade the probable cause requirement.111  Critics caution that the 
combined result of the intelligence-sharing and intelligence-gathering provisions 
could be the chilling of speech of those involved in political, religious, or 
humanitarian efforts.112 
Other provisions that increase the evidence-gathering powers of the government 
and infringe on Fourth Amendment rights include section 213, which authorizes 
delayed notice of searches if “immediate notification . . . may have an adverse 
result,”113 section 216, which gives the government significantly increased power to 
monitor one’s computer activity,114 section 206, which permits the use of “roving 
wiretaps” that effectively monitor a person rather than a particular device,115 and 
section 203(a)(1), which dramatically increases the ability of federal prosecutors to 
obtain information from grand jury witnesses about a variety of subjects and report it 
to numerous other federal agencies.116  Additionally, when the Attorney General 
certifies a non-citizen as a suspected terrorist, under the authority of section 412, the 
INS may indefinitely detain that person.117  Such practices violate the immigrant’s 
due process rights118 and are particularly disconcerting when the Attorney General’s 
conclusions are based on secret evidence.119 
The use of secret evidence is also specifically advocated by the USA PATRIOT 
Act.  Section 106 increases the President’s power to seize the property of any foreign 
person, organization, or country that has “planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in 
such hostilities or attacks against the United States.”120  Although property owners 
                                                                
109Id. at 598. 
110Id. 
111See USA PATRIOT Act § 218, 115 Stat. at 291; Becker, supra note 3, at 598-99. 
112Becker, supra note 3, at 601. 
113USA PATRIOT Act § 213, 115 Stat. at 285-86. 
114USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), (c), 115 Stat. at 288-90. 
115USA PATRIOT Act § 206, 115 Stat. at 282. 
116See USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 278-79; see also Becker, supra note 3, 
at 607-08; Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 328 (noting that the USA PATRIOT ACT has 
“bolstered federal law enforcement surveillance powers over citizens and noncitizens 
associated with ‘terrorism’”). 
117See USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), 115 Stat. at 350-51; Becker, supra note 3, at 609. 
118Becker, supra note 3, at 609-10; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1094-95. 
119See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1095 (noting that “the lack of concern for 
the rights of non-citizens runs thematically through the Administration’s response to the 
terrorist attacks”). 
120See USA PATRIOT Act § 106, 115 Stat. at 278; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 
1127. 
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may be able to appeal such a seizure under section 316 by claiming that the property 
was not an asset of suspected terrorists, section 316 also allows the government to 
use secret evidence in such a proceeding if revealing the evidence could compromise 
national security.121 
In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act both centralizes law enforcement authority 
in the Department of Justice and increases the scope of individuals under scrutiny for 
terrorist activities.122  In fact, “[t]he extent to which the[] executive branch powers 
have been consolidated in one official, the Attorney General, is unprecedented in 
recent history.”123  The USA PATRIOT Act is focused only on the activity of 
terrorists, but the Act redefines “domestic terrorism” to include a considerably 
broader range of threatening activities than ever before.124   Such wide-sweeping 
provisions create the possibility that the government will selectively target political 
groups with interests and priorities contrary to its own, groups that would not have 
been considered terrorist groups in previous years.  Focusing such broad powers in 
one person, the Attorney General, creates a tremendous potential for abuse.  
Less than a month after the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush 
issued an Executive Order, which enabled government lawyers to try non-citizens 
suspected of terrorism or harboring terrorists in military courts in which those 
defendants would have very few rights.125  In addition to infringing on the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial by dictating that trials would be held in front 
of a panel of military officers,126 the Order explicitly stated that the tribunals would 
not utilize “the principles of law or the rules of evidence” that are normally required 
in criminal trials because of the threat posed by international terrorism.127  This 
meant that defendants in military tribunals are not entitled to the presumption of 
innocence and their guilt does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in 
                                                                
121See USA PATRIOT Act § 316, 115 Stat. at 309; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 
1129. 
122See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1088-93. 
123Id. at 1089. 
124See USA PATRIOT Act § 802, 115 Stat. at 376; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 
1189. 
125See Military Order of Nov. 11, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terror, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).  See also Akram & 
Johnson, supra note 21, at 328; Becker, supra note 3, at 581. 
126Edward Alden, National Security vs. Due Process, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2003, available 
at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/excep/alden.html.  Also, according to Becker, “[n]either the 
Constitution nor any federal statute permits the President to create a military court with the 
jurisdiction to try all cases of alleged international terrorism against the United States” and the 
Military Order violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Becker, 
supra note 3, at 583-85.  Additionally, Becker argues that the two cases cited as precedent for 
the legality of the military tribunals are inapposite because in those cases the tribunals were 
established after a formal declaration of war, whereas Congress did not declare war after the 
events of September 11.  Id. at 587-91.  Thus, the legality of military tribunals is suspect to 
begin with. 
127Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1118-19 (citing Military Order of Nov. 11, 2001, 
66 Fed. Reg. at 57,833). 
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order to be convicted.128  Further, the Order stated that all evidence with “probative 
value to a reasonable person” could be utilized, but evidence that, if revealed, would 
threaten national security could be kept secret.129  Additionally, military tribunals 
were authorized to impose the death penalty with only a two-third majority vote in 
support.130   
On March 21, 2002, however, the rules of trials in military tribunals were 
modified somewhat.  The latest version of the rules requires that defendants be 
provided court-appointed military lawyers if they do not retain private counsel, that 
journalists be allowed to observe trials, that proceedings be closed when classified 
material is being discussed, that defendants be presumed innocent, that in order to 
convict the tribunal must find there to have been proof beyond a reasonable doubt by 
a two-thirds vote, that there be a unanimous verdict in order to impose the death 
penalty, and that appeals be heard by “panels of military and/or civilian specialists,” 
among other provisions.131  In practice, however, these alterations may not make a 
substantial difference because section 7(B) of the Department of Defense’s Military 
Commission Order states that, “[i]n the event of any inconsistency between the 
President’s Military Order and this Order, including any supplementary regulations 
or instructions issued under Section 7(A), the provisions of the President’s Military 
Order shall govern.”132 
Additionally, although defendants will be entitled to counsel, “defense attorneys 
are likely to be selected or scrutinized by the government because much of the 
evidence against their client will be classified information.”133  Also, the judges in 
such tribunals will be military officers who are probably very conscious of and 
concerned about national security interests.134  “Suspects tried under this Order will 
be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the military tribunals,” and thus they will not 
be entitled to any appeals other than the Secretary of Defense or President’s review 
of the military tribunal’s final decision.135  “[T]he Order provides the President . . . 
with the greatest array of legal powers to be exercised in the justice system that has 
ever been vested in a single person, office, or branch of government since the birth of 
this nation.”136 
Although it is frequently argued that terrorism offenses are not significantly 
different from other criminal infractions and thus should also be tried in ordinary 
                                                                
128Becker, supra note 3, at 582. 
129See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1119; Becker, supra note 3, at 582, 613. 
130Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1119.   
131Becker, supra note 3, at 585-86. 
132Id. at 586.  Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, § 7(A), (B) (Mar. 
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criminal courts,137 supporters of military tribunals argue that terrorists are war 
criminals and therefore should be tried in military tribunals.138  Additionally, trials in 
civilian courts may give terrorists a forum from which they can spread their views, 
continue to inspire fear, and perhaps even communicate with comrades.139 
III.  SECRET EVIDENCE IN THE ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI CASE 
Although the use of secret evidence was controversial before September 11,140 
recently, the Zacarias Moussaoui case has brought it back into the headlines.  The 
case is a powerful illustration of the additional policy concerns that have arisen since 
September 11 and the issuance of Bush’s Executive Order. 
Soon after September 11, 2001, newspapers began to announce that the “20th 
hijacker” had been identified.  Moussaoui, a French citizen of Moroccan descent, 
was already in the custody of the INS awaiting deportation when the attacks on 
September 11 occurred.141  He had attracted the attention of the FBI because of 
strange behavior exhibited during flight school training.142  In February of 2001, 
Moussaoui began to take flight lessons in a small Cessna plane.143  By May he had 
grown tired of these lessons and contacted Pan American International Flight School 
to learn how to fly a Boeing 747, a considerably larger plane.144   
Because most students learning to fly Boeing 747s have pilots’ licenses, work for 
an airline, and have accumulated “several thousand flight hours” and Moussaoui had 
none of these attributes, he attracted the attention of his instructors.145  In August of 
2001, one of the flight instructors contacted the Minneapolis branch of the FBI.146  
The FBI office began an “international terrorism investigation of Moussaoui” 
                                                                
137See, e.g., Gross, supra note 133, at 69 (stating that “[i]t follows that the entire process 
remains within a special military system; whereas, the offense itself is no different from any 
other criminal offense tried within the civilian framework”); Spiro, supra note 5, at 665 
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138Gross, supra note 133, at 58. 
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143Id. at 16. 
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145Id. 
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because they believed Moussaoui was a national security threat.147  By the time of the 
investigation, Moussaoui was illegally remaining in the United States, as he had 
entered using his French passport, which allowed him to stay in the country without 
a visa until May 22, 2001, ninety days after his arrival.148 
Moussaoui continued to exhibit bizarre behavior, including displaying an unusual 
interest in “the operation of the plane’s doors and control panel.”149  Moussaoui also 
stated that he would “‘love’ to fly a simulated flight from Heathrow Airport in 
England to John F. Kennedy Airport in New York.”150  After determining that it 
would be dangerous to allow Moussaoui to complete any more flying lessons, FBI 
agents temporarily detained Moussaoui, and then took him into custody after 
discovering that he was in the United States illegally.151  When Moussaoui showed 
the FBI agents his passport case, they saw that he had a bank statement for an 
account in Oklahoma in which $32,000 had been deposited in cash.152  Moussaoui 
was unable to explain the details surrounding the deposit.153   
Moussaoui’s activity aroused the suspicions of numerous government agents.154  
In particular, Moussaoui’s desire to fly a simulated England-to-New York flight 
made one CIA officer suspect that he may be a hijacker, only furthering concerns 
resulting from Moussaoui’s earlier denial that he was a Muslim while a companion 
of Moussaoui’s had told the FBI that Moussaoui was a fundamentalist.155   
By the end of August, the FBI determined that there was “insufficient 
information to show that Moussaoui was an agent of any foreign power.”156  The FBI 
began to arrange for Moussaoui to be deported to France in mid-September.157  Then, 
the attacks of September 11 occurred. 
After that day, the FBI’s investigation of Moussaoui continued and on December 
11, 2001, exactly three months after the attacks, Moussaoui was indicted on one 
charge each of conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national 
boundaries, conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, conspiracy to destroy aircraft, 
conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to murder United States 
employees, and conspiracy to destroy United States property.158  That day, at a news 
conference, Attorney General Ashcroft stated that “[t]he first indictment ha[d] been 
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brought against the terrorists of September 11th.”159  Ashcroft described the 
indictment as charging Moussaoui with “undergoing the same training, receiving the 
same funding, and pledging the same commitment to kill Americans as the 
hijackers.”160  The indictment also alleged that Ramzi Binalshibh funded the efforts 
of Moussaoui and others from Germany.161  The government stated that it would seek 
the death penalty for Moussaoui.162 
The Moussaoui case has been unpredictable and complicated from the beginning.  
On January 3, 2002, when Moussaoui was arraigned, he “refused ‘in the name of 
Allah’ to enter a plea.”163  The judge entered a not guilty plea for Moussaoui.164  
Throughout the case, Moussaoui has continually criticized both his counsel and the 
judge.165  On April 22, 2002, Moussaoui told the court that he wanted to represent 
himself.166  After Judge Leonie Brinkema warned Moussaoui that by acting as his 
own attorney he would not have access to the classified material that would be used 
against him, Moussaoui stated that he understood the consequences of self-
representation and Brinkema determined that he could represent himself with the 
assistance of co-counsel.167  Though Moussaoui has made numerous motions to 
dismiss his co-counsel, Brinkema has denied them due to Moussaoui’s demonstrated 
lack of understanding of the American legal system, the complexity of the charges, 
the large amount of secret evidence to which Moussaoui does not have access, the 
fact that the government is seeking the death penalty, and the “strict conditions of 
[his] confinement.”168   
In August of 2002, Moussaoui filed a motion “to get access to so-called secret 
evidence” in which he requested a copy of the videotape in which Osama bin Laden 
                                                                
159News Conference Regarding Zacarias Moussaoui, DOJ Conference Center (Dec. 11, 
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index.html.  Moussaoui is being held in solitary confinement.  Warren Richey, In Terror Case, 
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http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/03/attacks.moussaoui/index.html (Aug. 3, 2002). 
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discusses the attacks on September 11.169  Brinkema denied the motion stating that 
“the defendant’s repeated prayers for the destruction of the United States and the 
American people, admission to being a member of al Qaeda, and pledged allegiance 
to Osama bin Laden are strong evidence that the national security could be 
threatened if the defendant had access to classified information.”170  The judge 
further stated that “the United States’ interest in protecting its national security 
information outweighs the defendant’s desire to review the classified discovery” and 
that Moussaoui’s “Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are adequately protected by 
standby counsel’s review of the classified discovery and their participation in any 
proceedings . . . .”171  The judge also noted that the government was in the process of 
declassifying some of its information to which Moussaoui would then have access.172 
Moussaoui’s case was delayed once until January of 2003 and then again until 
March of 2003, the first time because of the time required for Moussaoui to review 
the large volume of evidence to be used by the government at trial and the second 
time because the FBI accidentally left classified documents in Moussaoui’s cell after 
questioning him.173  On January 30, 2003, the judge held a secret hearing, from 
which even Moussaoui was barred, during which the prosecutors explained their 
theory of the case.174  Rather than believing that Moussaoui was the “twentieth 
hijacker,” prosecutors stated that they would seek to prove that Moussaoui intended 
to hijack and fly a fifth plane into the White House.175  Although Moussaoui’s 
standby counsel was allowed to attend the hearing, because Moussaoui does not have 
national security clearance, they could not discuss with him the classified evidence 
mentioned at the hearing.176  In April of 2003, however, Brinkema ruled that the 
government must release some portions of the classified transcript of the hearing to 
Moussaoui so that he can know the government’s theory of the case and prepare his 
defense.177  Although defendants are not ordinarily entitled to know the 
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government’s theory of the case before trial, Brinkema stated that because 
Moussaoui’s counsel already heard the theory in the hearing, Moussaoui is also 
entitled to know what it is.178 
At the same hearing, Judge Brinkema ruled that Moussaoui could question 
Binalshibh in a videotaped deposition; Binalshibh had been captured by the United 
States.179  Moussaoui claims that Binalshibh can help him prove that, although he is a 
member of al Qaeda, he was not involved with the attacks on September 11.180  The 
Justice Department appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
stating that permitting Moussaoui to question Binalshibh would cause “‘immediate 
and irreparable’ harm to national security and would imperil the prosecution of other 
major terror suspects.”181  Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff argued that 
Moussaoui does not have a constitutional right to question enemy combatants being 
held overseas, despite the fact that they may have information that could aid in his 
defense.182  Moussaoui’s defense counsel stated that Ashcroft had filed a secret 
affidavit in which he stated that he would not make Binalshibh available to the 
defense and that the government should be penalized for this decision.183   
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit “reject[ed] the government’s appeal,” 
ruling that the lower court’s order had not reached an appropriate stage for review.184  
The court stated that if the Justice Department refused to allow Moussaoui to 
interview Binalshibh and the trial court sanctioned the government, the Fourth 
Circuit could then intervene in the trial and suggest that the prosecution and defense 
attempt to find an alternative solution.185  The government, refusing to consider 
alternatives, stated that it would ask the three-judge panel to reverse its ruling and 
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that it was also considering appealing to the full Fourth Circuit, contending that “the 
government should not be forced to suffer a sanction for refusing to permit a 
deposition that will endanger national security before obtaining appellate review of 
the district court’s order.”186   
Despite repeated statements by the Justice Department that it is confident that the 
case can proceed in civilian courts,187 the government also stated that it would 
consider transferring Mouussaoui’s case to a military tribunal in order to avoid the 
consequences of Brinkema’s decision.188  Brinkema herself expressed doubt that the 
case could be fully adjudicated in civilian court due to the large amount of secret 
evidence in the case.189  Judge Brinkema has stated that she is “‘disturbed by the 
extent to which the United States’ intelligence officials have classified the pleadings, 
orders and memorandum opinions in this case.”190 
The Justice Department continued to refuse to allow Moussaoui access to 
Binalshibh,191 stating that permitting such questioning “would needlessly jeopardize 
national security at a time of war with an enemy who has already murdered 
thousands of our citizens.”192  In response, Judge Brinkema ruled that the 
government could not seek the death penalty or “present evidence that Moussaoui 
was involved in the [September 11] attacks.”193  The government appealed the 
decision to the Fourth Circuit.194  The Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Brinkema’s 
order to produce Binalshibh195 and rejected the government’s suggestion that 
Moussaoui only be provided summaries of Binalshibh’s statements.196  The Fourth 
Circuit determined that an alternative solution could be reached, however, and 
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187See, e.g., Hirschkorn & Frieden, supra note 180; Greg Gordon, Judge Concerned About 
Secrecy in Moussaoui Case, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 5, 2003, available at 
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195Id. at 476. 
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removed the sanctions against the government.197  The Fourth Circuit stated that “no 
punitive sanction is warranted here because the Government has rightfully exercised 
its prerogative to protect national security interests by refusing to produce the 
witnesses.”198  
IV.  CONCLUSION: THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11:  
DUE PROCESS VS. NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 
The current controversies in the Moussaoui case reveal that in addition to the 
concerns involved with the use of secret evidence before September 11, the events of 
September 11 and the resulting legislation created considerable additional policy 
issues. 
Before September 11, concern was widespread about the substantive content of 
the material being kept secret.  In numerous cases in which classified evidence that 
the government cited as the basis for indictment and conviction has been revealed, 
the evidence has not provided a sufficient basis for detention.199  The potential for 
related abuse of such evidence is especially worrisome in the post-September 11 era 
because of the possibility of the widespread use of secret evidence in military 
tribunals in which defendants have even fewer rights than in civilian courts.200   
Additionally, there is evidence that secret evidence has been used only in cases 
concerning certain groups, in particular, Arabs and Muslims.201  Apart from the 
problems inherent in racial-profiling in any application of criminal law, 
discriminatory use of secret evidence also threatens to chill the political speech of 
Arabs and Muslims.202   
The Moussaoui case demonstrates that national security concerns are of the 
utmost priority to the federal government and that, in some cases, they can trump 
concerns about a defendant’s individual liberties.  The case also shows that although 
both the judges and the government lawyers involved attempt to resolve the priorities 
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of national security and constitutional rights, often the parties come to differing 
conclusions about the appropriate course of the case.  Bush’s Executive Order gives 
the government lawyer considerable power in this situation.  Because prosecutors 
can threaten to drop a case and bring it in a military tribunal where defendants’ 
constitutional rights are even less protected, judges may resolve some motions in the 
government’s favor simply to give the defendant the greatest protection of his rights.  
By tailoring decisions to the specific facts of cases and avoiding complete dismissal 
where possible, judges encourage government lawyers to keep their cases in civilian 
courts.  The ability of government lawyers to bring their cases in military tribunals in 
the first place, however, does give the prosecution significant influence over the 
balance between national security concerns and defendants’ rights. 
The events of recent years, including the attacks of September 11, combat in Iraq, 
and frequent terror alerts, demonstrate that concern about national security is 
strongly justified.  The visibility and emotional impact of these issues, though, does 
not decrease the additional threat imposed by curtailment of defendants’ rights.  The 
ability of the government lawyer to utilize secret evidence both furthers the justice 
done in cases involving national security and threatens to set a dangerous precedent 
allowing the restriction of defendants’ rights when priorities are deemed important 
enough.   
In order to preserve the integrity of our criminal justice system, government 
lawyers should bring terrorism cases in civilian courts to the extent that they can do 
so without threatening important cases that involve significant substantive secret 
evidence.  Numerous critics caution that we must remain aware of the long-term 
consequences of the current use of secret evidence and military tribunals.203  A 
reconsideration of the Secret Evidence Repeal Acts after the trials of those connected 
to the September 11 attacks would be well advised.  Because Bush’s Executive 
Order gives government lawyers significant power and discretion, it is imperative 
that secret evidence be used only when necessary and only when the secret evidence 
effectively proves elements of a crime in order for the government to maintain 
integrity and the country’s trust in these important prosecutions. 
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